centers located in the most prestigious medical schools in the United States as well as to create seven more such centers world wide.

Thus, it is evident how all encompassing our representation is in and for the Parkinson community.

I assure you of the utmost support of the entire National Parkinson Foundation organization on behalf of the ''Morris K. Udall Parkinson's Research, Assistance, and Education Act of 1995''.

I also wish to assure you that I personally am available in any manner you see fit to assist you in support of the bill.

Sincerely,

NATHAN SLEWETT,
Chairman.

LETTERS OF SUPPORT

Letters of support were received from: Orange Elderly Services, Inc., Orange, CA; the Grand Strand Parkinson's Support Group, Calabash, NC; The Parkinson's Disease and Movement Disorders Center at the Graduate Hospital, Philadelphia, PA; Parkinson's Support Group of Santa Maria, CA; Parkinson's and Other Neurological Discorders, Inc., Joplin, MO; Social Service Federation, Parkinson's Support Group, Englewood, NJ; Parkinson's Disease Support Group, Sioux Valley Hospital, Sioux Falls, SD; San Joaquin Valley Parkinson Support Group, Turlock, CA; Parkinson's Support Group of Greater Syracuse, NY; Tri-State Pittsburgh Chapter, American Parkinsons Disease Association, Pittsburgh, PA; Houston Area Parkinson Society; Houston, TX; Chestnut Hill Rehabilitation Hospital Parkinson's Disease Support Group, Wyndmoor, PA; Parkinson Foundation of Harris County, Houston, TX; American Parkinson Disease Association Information and Referral Center, National Capital Area, Fairfax, VA; Norfolk Parkinson Support Group, Norfolk, NE; Parkinson Support Group of Tarrant County, TX, Fort Worth, TX; Lake County, Illinois Parkinson's Support Group, Mundelein, IL; Wellness Interaction Network, Encino, CA; Palo Alto Parkinson's Support Group, Palo Alto, CA; Parkinson Partners of NW Pennsylvania, Erie, PA; South Sound Parkinson's Support Group, Olympia, WA; Rockford, Illinois Parkinson's Support Group, Rockford, IL; Greater Daytona Parkinson's Support Group, Ormond Beach, FL; American Parkinson Disease Association, Oahu chapter, Honolulu, HI; Greencroft Retirement Community Parkinson's Support Group, Goshen, IN; Parkinsonian Publications; Harvey Checkoway, PhD, Professor of Environmental Health and Epidemiology, University of Washington, Seattle, WA; Walter C. Low, Ph.D., professor of neurosurgery, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN; Parsippany Parkinson Support Group, Parsippany, NJ; Wise Young, Ph.D., MD, professor of neurosurgery, physiology, and biophysics, New York University Medical Center, New York, NY; Chico Parkinson's Support Group, Chico, CA; Colonial Club Senior Center Parkinson's Support Group, Sun Prairie, WI; American Parkinson Disease Association Information and Referral Center, Suffolk County, Smithtown, NY; Longmont, Colorado Parkinson's Disease Support Group, Longmont, CO; North Central Mississippi Parkinson's Support Group, Greenwood, MS; Central New York Parkinson Support Group, Herkimer, NY; Erwin B. Montgomery, Jr., MD, associate professor of neurology, the University of Arizona Health Sciences Center, Tucson, AZ; Nebraska Parkinson's Action Information Network, Lincoln, NE; Parkinson Support Group of North Jersey, Verona, NJ; Parkinson's Enrichment Program Support Group, New York, NY; William C. Koller, MD, Ph.D., Professor and chairman, department of neurology, the University of Kansas Medical Center, Kansas City, KS; Dallas Area Parkinsonism Society, Dallas, TX; the Movement Disorder Society, Houston, TX; Eisenhower Medical Center Parkinson Center of Excellence, Rancho Mirage, CA; American Parkinson Disease Association Information and Referral Center, Reno, NV; Parkinson Support Group Foundation of Long Island, Inc., Rockville Centre, NY.●

MCKENDREE COLLEGE'S NEW PRESIDENT

● Mr. SIMON. Mr. President, James W. Dennis will be inaugurated as McKendree College's 32d president on April 29. Whether as a faculty member or administrator, Dr. Dennis has had an exceptional commitment to young people.

Throughout his career, Dr. Dennis has been active in both the academic and nonacademic communities. For instance, Dr. Dennis founded the National Youth Program which offers educational and sports opportunities to disadvantaged youth. He has also provided learning opportunities for high school and college educators by establishing the educational seminars. A world class advocate and educator, Dr. Dennis has promoted student voluntarism and supported area alcohol and drug-abuse education efforts.

As Illinois' oldest college, McKendree will prosper with Dr. Dennis' activism and commitment. I extend my best wishes to Dr. Dennis and McKendree College.●

TRIBUTE TO LOUISVILLE MALE HIGH SCHOOL

● Mr. MCCONNELL. Mr. President, I would like to recognize Louisville Male High School, from Kentucky, who won first place at the State competition of the We the People . . . The Citizen and the Constitution. This victory entitles these young scholars to compete in the national finals held in our Nation's Capital.

The members of the Louisville Male High School team are: Shannon Bender, Josh Bridgwater, Shilo Burke, Katie Callender, Scott Embry, Jessi Followwill, Adam Greenwell, John Grissom, Christy Jones, Jonathan Keith, Stephanie McAlmont, Stephen McAlmont, Shannon McMillan, Travis Moore, Kristi Mosier, Adam Pedigo, Melanie Rapp, Amber Rowan, Chris Rutledge, Shannon Simms, Eric Stevens, April Stivers, Ricky Suel, Danyaun Vandgrift, Shaniqua Wade.

I would also like to recognize their teacher, Sandra D. Hoover, who deserves much of the credit for the success of the team. The district coordinator, Tommy Dowler, and the State coordinator, Tami Dowler also contributed a significant amount of time and effort to help the team reach the national finals.

The We the People . . . the Citizen and the Constitution program, funded by Congress, is designated to educate young people about the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. The 3-day national competition simulates a congressional hearing in which students' oral presentations are judged on the basis of their knowledge of constitutional principles and their ability to apply them to historical and contemporary issues. Members of Congress and their staff enhance the program by discussing current constitutional issues with both students and teachers.

Mr. President, I would like my colleagues to join me in recognizing these students. It is refreshing to see young people wanting to gain an informed perspective about the history and the principles of the United States constitutional government. I wish the members of the Male High School We the People team the best of luck and look forward to their future in politics and government.●

JAMES R. SCHLESINGER: PAUL H. NITZE AWARD RECIPIENT

● Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, the Center for Naval Analyses in Alexandria, VA, annually presents the Paul H. Nitze Award in recognition of important contributions to national and international security affairs. This year's recipient of the Nitze Award is the Honorable James R. Schlesinger, who received the award on April 6, 1995.

Dr. James Schlesinger is of course one of the most experienced and able public servants of our time. A distinguished economist, he served during the Nixon administration in several prominent capacities in the Bureau of the Budget, ascending to Assistant Director in 1970, when the Bureau became the Office of Management and Budget. And, as Senators are well aware, he went on to become Director of Central Intelligence and Secretary of Defense in the Nixon and Ford administrations, and Secretary of Energy under President Carter. Dr. Schlesinger has also served for many years as senior advisor at Lehman Brothers, and he is widely respected for his scholarship arising out of his long association with the Center for Strategic and International Studies at Georgetown University.

On receiving the Paul H. Nitze Award, Jim Schlesinger delivered an outstanding lecture on ''American Leadership, Isolationism, and Unilateralism'' in which he points out the need for close attention to the leadership role of the United States in international affairs in the post-cold-war era.

Mr. President, when a scholar and public eminence of James Schlesinger's wisdom and stature addresses himself to an issue of such significance to world affairs, I believe it is incumbent on all of us to take notice. Every Senator will benefit from a careful reading of Dr. Schlesinger's speech, and I therefore ask that it be printed in the RECORD.

The speech follows:

SOME REFLECTIONS ON AMERICAN LEADERSHIP, ISOLATIONISM, AND UNILATERALISM

Ladies and Gentlemen: It is a special pleasure as well as an honor to have been chosen to receive the Paul H. Nitze Award. It is a special pleasure because Paul and I have been collaborating directly for almost a quarter of a century—and indirectly for even longer. I started working for Paul in the early 60's, when I was at the RAND Corporation, and he was head of International Security Affairs at the Pentagon. Years later when I was Secretary of Defense, Paul also worked for me. That clearly was the way it read on the organization chart, though, for those of you who may not be aware of this, such charts do not necessarily convey the whole of reality.

Of course, it is also a great honor for reasons that must be obvious—Paul's many contributions to this nation, his keenness of intellect (not the most common characteristic among high officials), his abiding role as a senior statesman. But perhaps one of Paul's most remarkable strengths is the cool and detached view that habitually he has taken with regard to national security affairs—rising above the hubbub of controversy. That characteristic has been displayed most prominently in matters such as the Palestine crisis of 1947, the Watergate crisis, and a ''walk in the woods''. Paul has displayed not only staying power, but (to avert to an issue that first brought us together) great throwweight in national security affairs. So it is a distinct honor as well as a personal pleasure to have been selected for this year's Nitze Award.

As most of us will recall, Paul Nitze was one of the principal authors of NSC–68, which, in the aftermath of World War II, charted that transformed role for the United States in international affairs—of leadership and continuous engagement. In a sense, the intellectual underpinnings of NSC–68 guided American policy for more than 40 years. But we all realize the era of NSC–68 is now over. It ended, rather abruptly, with the demise of the Soviet Union. Of course, it was Soviet misbehavior in the postwar world that formed the national consensus which gave sustenance to the design that underlay NSC–68. It manifested itself in the Greek-Turkish aid program, the Marshall Plan, the NATO Alliance—and, shortly later, the response to aggression in the Korean peninsula and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.

Yet, with the fall of the Soviet Union, this nation has been stripped both of guideposts to our foreign policy and of the national consensus that underpins that policy. Both the uncertainties and the challenges are substantial. This nation is deeply enmeshed in world affairs. For better or worse, it is the leading world power. No longer is it free, as it felt itself to be through much of its history, to stand aloof, to isolate itself from political events abroad. Yet, the clear guidelines that marked those past period of engagement are now lacking.

For this reason I want to spend some time this evening reflecting on American leadership, on isolationism, and on unilateralism. In his inaugural Nitze Award lecture, Sir Michael Howard looked back in time to review lessons from the Cold War Period. I seek to look forward—to what comes next. Of late, one may have noticed the demands for ''American leadership'' and the charges of ''isolationist'' that have reverberated across the political landscape. That the charge of ''isolationist'' is so widely used as a political epithet reveals that the notion that America can stand aloof has little resonance with the American public. The public fully accepts that its economic ties, its political interests, even its residual vulnerability in an era of nuclear weapons, preclude a wholesale American withdrawal from international affairs. Moreover, even if we could stand aside, the voice of conscience insists that it would not be right for America to be indifferent to political travail, particularly when it affects long-time allies of the United States.

By contrast to these rejected charges of isolationism, the image of American leadership has a grand resonance. Unhappy events overseas, whether or not there is any serious American interest, are regularly blamed on the ''failure of American leadership''. Everybody seems to urge American leadership. Americans like to flatter themselves with the notion that this country is the ''sole surviving superpower''—and expect action to make those unhappy events go away—so long as it does not cost us very much. Our European allies—sometimes rightly, sometimes wrongly—have demanded: Where is American leadership? (Of late that cry has diminished in intensity, as European expectations regarding American leadership have faded.) Our Asian associates have resented our continuous preaching, yet all are concerned that an erosion over time of American power in the Pacific will allow an instability from which until now they have been protected. Preachers, teachers, editorial writers, if not little children in the street, seem to presuppose American leadership—but fundamentally treat it as a panacea—as a ready antidote for most, if not all, of the world's problems.

Thus, the real issue comes down, not to withdrawal or isolation—those are epithets—but to when, where, and how we choose to intervene. In part the charge of isolation really comes down to a suspicion of unilateral moves by the United States on the international scene. For those who embrace multilateralism and who prefer to work through international bodies, the charge of isolationist comes readily as a riposte to those who do not agree with them. But multilateralism can readily be a cover for inaction. It can also be, and frequently is, a vehicle for ineffective action. Of course, those who instinctively prefer to work through international bodies are frequently right that their opponents are short sighted or even blindly chauvinistic. But their actions are scarcely isolationist. Rightly or wrongly, they are regularly intended to achieve international objectives. But such unilateralist impulses may be equally flawed or ineffective.

The Clinton Administration has chided its foes for being isolationists. It is perhaps merely the most recent assertion of ''assertive multilaterialism''. Their critics, in turn, have responded in kind. The Administration may fervently believe in the collaboration among nations, yet it has shown a distinct proclivity to become embroiled in quarrels with individual nations, sometimes including old allies, over issues which are either only remotely our business or over which our influence is modest. Endangering ties with those that have been reliable allies, along with ineffectual, if irritating, advocacy of policies over which our influence is slight runs the risk of weakening the ties between ourselves and other nations—in effect isolating the United States. In terms of its accolades to international engagement, the Administration is clearly beyond criticism. It is only those specific actions that the Administration takes, which properly comes out and which understandably alarms its critics. Irrespective of the good intentions, such actions may weaken the international position of the United States.

Thus, the question is not one of isolation or withdrawal. The question is where, when, and on what terms does the United States become engaged. What is our foreign policy to be—now that the conceptually easy task of containment has come to an end. It is perhaps unnecessary to remind this audience that such questions are antecedent to the issue of shaping our military forces. The shaping of those forces depends upon the role that the United States wishes to play in the world—and the circumstances under which those forces may become engaged.

II

Thus, we seek a new paradigm for an effective foreign policy. We seek, in effect, a successor to NSC–68. But it is not easy to come by. Some of the difficulty in finding that new paradigm is inherent. It is probably unavoidable that we flounder to some degree at historic turning points. We did so after World War II. It was not until 1947–1948 that we began to find our bearings—and to do that we had the indispensable help of Joseph Stalin. Now the international scene is vastly more complex and yet there is much less direct danger to the United States. Though there are numerous eruptions on the international scene, there is little to concentrate the mind.

In every such eruption, somewhere someone will call on the United States to do something. ''Concentrating the mind'' is indispensable to some degree. It is better that we recognize that simple fact rather than having reality thrust upon us. No nation can do everything; we would be wise not to aspire to do so.

I can recall over 40 years ago listening to a debate at Harvard regarding the resolution of one of our seemingly perennial steel strikes—during which John Dunlop, later Secretary of Labor, commented: ''It is important for a democracy not too frequently to demonstrate its own ineffectiveness''. I have never forgotten that injunction. But what is true for domestic policy is even more true for foreign policy. Becoming engaged in numerous disputes, particularly if one lacks public backing, is the high road to ineffectiveness.

Perhaps it is obvious to say that the problem is especially difficult for the United States, which, as a world power, might find its attention drawn in any one of many directions—and for which public backing is a sometime thing and must be carefully fostered.

In the past and for other great powers, the choice of foreign policy tendered to be far simpler. For most it was geographically determined. There likely would be an historic enemy. For, say, France or Germany, there was little uncertainty as to who one's foe might be and where one must be prepared to fight. To be sure, for Britain, whose imperial interests were more far-flung, the problem was broader: to protect communications with the empire and to prevent any single power from dominating the Continent. Yet for the United States today, our interests are even more diverse, and the challenge of being a world power has grown since the era of European dominance.

Moreover, the task was far easier in another respect. Given what was seen as clear national interests, the unquestioned rule for the European powers stressed the priority to be assigned to foreign policy. The phrase from Bismarckian German puts it simply: das Primat der Aussenpolitik—the primacy of foreign policy. Yet, the primacy was far easier to establish in a dynastic regime. Even in the case of England, the problem was not insuperable—in light of its clearly defined foreign policy, the preservation of the balance of power, and a continued willingness of the British public to defer to a strong governing class.

But here in the United States we now show signs of turning das Primat der

Aussenpolitik on its head and allowing foreign policy to be determined by domestic politics. In any democracy that is a continuing temptation; it is particularly a problem in the United States where the vicissitudes of public opinion can so easily determine public policy. And, particularly is this so in the absence of an overriding fear (as with the Soviet Union) or an overriding anger as with Japan or Spain in an earlier era (Remember Pearl Harbor, Remember the Maine). In sustaining public support, it is frequently helpful if the anger has focused on a weak foe (Mexico, Spain, or Grenada) for then one can count on public exultation in a ''glorious little war''.

When, however, there is no clear and formidable foe and when only a few Middle Eastern countries seem to generate public anger, it is difficult to sustain a priority in foreign policy (as George Bush belatedly discovered). It is thus seductively easy to accept the primary of domestic politics.

In addition to the absence of a clear focus and the existence of diverse areas of potential responsibility for the United States, which alone is a world power, there is a further problem. There are too many distractions, most of them transitory in nature. It is difficult to concentrate on those issues that might represent ''permanent interests'', given the worldwide domain of television with a power, if not an agenda, that exceeds that of ''yellow journalism'' in the past. Rather than permanent interests, we experience sudden passionate interest in the Bosnians, the Kurds, the Rwandans, the flight of Haitian or Cuban refugees, then the Kurds again that lasts a few weeks or months at most—until the story pales, the public tires of it, and then moves on. Surely that complicates the task of selecting those interests and issues to which we should adhere. It makes the challenge of sustaining support for long term interests, as opposed to momentary distractions, immensely difficult.

Need I add that these factors also make immensely difficult the task of force planning. There is uncertainty as to what our foreign policy may be. Consequently, there is an uncertainty as to where we might fight. Choosing two major regional conflicts as ''representative'' is hardly an ideal solution—reminding us of the locale of past conflicts rather than of the likely future conflicts. Moreover, under these circumstances there are genuine conflicts regarding specific foreign objectives. With respect to our Asian policies, for example, the DOD's International Security Affairs opines: ''the United States remains dedicated to strengthening alliances and friendships''. Yet, this scarcely describes the motives that guide the actions of the U.S. Trade Representative, who is predisposed to confrontations with the same Asian states—by implicitly, if not explicitly, threatening to weaken those alliances and friendships. In U.S. policy there is a growing mixture of economic rivalry and alliance reassurance. Perhaps this is unavoidable, yet clearly it undercuts any joint planning with those allies on whom we should be able to count.

III

I have now devoted some time to explaining why in this postwar world the inherent difficulties for this nation shaping its foreign policy have grown. Now let me turn to analyzing how our own actions have been compounding those difficulties inherent in this altered world—and have seemed to undercut that role of world leader which we ostensibly cherish. But first I must portray the general behavior and the style necessary to sustain the role of world leader. One does not require any special knowledge or erudition to understand these requirements; they should be obvious to any long time observer of politics.

First, to be accepted as a leader, a nation must be seen not to be acting primarily for its own account. It must understand and take into account the interests of its followers. It must also be seen to be genuinely interested in international affairs—rather than blindly follow the dictates of its own domestic politics. AND it must focus on matters of real consequence.

Second, it must be reasonably consistent. Changes in policy should be few in number—and taken for what are seen as valid reasons. One must be steadfast. A great power does not lightly enter into commitments, but when it does so it must be with the serious intent of carrying them out. In brief those who wish to retain a position of leadership must avoid capriciousness. Otherwise one's credibility rapidly diminishes, and one's influence fades with almost equal rapidity.

Of late the United States has failed to observe these obvious rules. While we flatter ourselves as the world's sole remaining superpower, we seem to be amazed that our influence seems to be shrinking. To be sure, some such shrinkage is inherent in the change of circumstances. With the demise of the Soviet threat, other nations, previously dependent upon the United States for protection, are now less dependent and so less inclined to defer to our wishes. But the erosion of our influence proceeds more rapidly than required by the circumstances. If we are to arrest that decline, we must understand the causes.

If a nation is to lead, it must seem to be genuinely concerned about international affairs—and not driven primarily by domestic pressures. Nonetheless, in recent years our policies being driven by domestic constituencies appear to be the rule rather than the exception. In Northern Ireland, in Haiti, in respect to Cuba or Haitian refugees, in much of the Middle East, our policies seem to be driven by domestic pressures—and we appear largely indifferent regarding the international repercussions. A hungerstrike and pressures from the Black Caucus brought a shift in our policies toward Haiti. A senior official backgrounds to the press that: ''No one will get to the right of us on Iran''. The President's National Security Advisor reveals that the United States will attempt once again to tighten sanctions on Libya by persuading our European partners to cease buying Libyan oil. This revelation occurs, not in a regular diplomatic forum, but in a meeting with the families of the victims of Pan Am 108.

Disappointed as they may have been, Europeans were not really surprised that the United States did not regard Bosnia as primarily our business. (Especially was this so in light of the European Union's having previously told us that Europe would handle Bosnia, and there was no need for our intervention.) They were, however, non-plussed that we would regard the affairs of Northern Ireland as primarily our business. Northern Ireland is, after all, a province of the United Kingdom, part of its sovereign territory. For us to butt in (no other expression seems suitable!) for domestic political reasons appeared both ignorant and bumptious. Such behavior is scarcely consistent with the solidarity of NATO, let alone the ''special relationship''. I cannot overstate the dismay of other Europeans regarding our treatment of the British. The general reaction is: If the Americans will behave this way to their most intimate partner, what can the rest of us expect? The diplomat's word for this episode is: ''disappointment''.

This Administration is explicitly vulnerable to the conservative charge that it is soft—most notably soft on Saddam Hussein. For this reason it seeks, with ever lessening support and growing desperation to maintain the sanctions on Iraq that were adopted in 1990. Three of the five permanent members of the Security Council have now introduced a resolution to terminate those sanctions. Even Iraq's neighbors regard our policy as no longer productive, though they are reluctant to say so to our highest officials. If the United States is seen primarily for domestic political reasons to be stretching out sanctions believed to be unproductive, if not unjust, how ready will others again be to follow American leadership in imposing sanctions? The answer is clear. A willingness to put domestic pressures in front of international considerations will undermine the very multilateral mechanisms that the Administration believes ideal for abiding international stability. Indeed, with respect to Libya, Iran, and Iraq, rather than achieving its declared goal isolating those countries, our diplomacy tends to isolate the United States itself.

The effect of these altogether too many cases of putting domestic politics first is to obscure those instances in which the Administration has rightly focused our policies on the longer term interests both of this nation and of international stability—most notably our relations with Russia and the spread of nuclear weapons. Other nations doubt that we understand their interests, let alone take them into adequate account. When the United States proclaims that providing (6000 thermal megawatts of) light water reactors to North Korea is the best remedy for curbing North Korea's drive to acquire nuclear weapons, it makes it somewhat difficult, to say the least, to persuade the Russians that providing light water reactors in Iran creates an open road to nuclear spread. To be effective, even with respect to common long-term interests, a leader needs to maintain its credibility.

The problem goes well beyond the Administration. One can think of many advantages of divided government—invetting domestic proposals. However, I myself can think of virtually no advantages in divided government with respect to international affairs. It weakens the voice of any Administration—and it undermines the credibility of American diplomacy. This Congress now seems inclined to inflict on the Clinton Administration's policies regarding Bosnia and regarding Russian aid the same kind of cavalier treatment with which its Democratic predecessor treated President Bush's policies toward China after Tiananmen Square. Whatever the merits or defects of our policy on the so-called Mexican bail out or toward Iran, Congressional intervention does not seem likely to improve them.

Our policies have been changeable rather than consistent. Our commitments do not appear to be reliable. Our policies appear excessively driven by domestic constituencies. The result is that the call for American leadership is diminishing in strength. Increasingly American leadership appears to be a problem rather than a solution.

We are tempting fate. Some years ago Paul Nitze suggested that ''other nations can be expected to coalesce to cut us down to size''. Unless we are prepared to deflect our own domestic pressures, to take international considerations primarily into account, to understand the differing interests of other nations, and to pursue worthy long-term, common interests, we shall regrettably accelerate that process. Writing in 1950 in his splendid work, ''American Diplomacy,'' George Kennan observed: ''history does not forgive us our national mistakes because they are explicable in terms of our domestic politics''. He also states: ''A nation which excuses its own failures by the same sacred untouchableness of

its own habits can excuse itself into complete disaster''.

With the end of the totalitarian threat, with the remarkably changed international circumstances, the danger to the United States has visibly receded, and there is little likelihood of a ''complete disaster''. Nonetheless, despite the lessened danger, the possibility remains of cumulative small setbacks and the erosion of our position. We may ignore such possibilities—and it is unlikely to be fatal. Still the rules are quite simple. To be a leader, a nation must sustain its credibility.

Ladies and Gentlemen, you have been more than patient. I must draw to a close—and must also offer a few conclusions.

During the Cold War the stakes were immense: the preservation of the Western democracies and, if I may say so, the substantial preservation of Western Civilization itself of which the United States was the security mainstay. (I say this despite the probable assault of the multiculturalists.) But with the end of the cohesion and menace of the Soviet empire, the stakes have now shrunken. The United States, the world's most powerful nation, is in a sense free to be capricious, to be irresponsible. Yet, it will not soon fall into direct and serious danger. Nonetheless, there are restraints—and there are prospective consequences of our actions. The price of capriciousness will inevitably be a loss of credibility—and of our position of leadership.

While the United States is a powerful country, it is not all-powerful. At the close of the Nineteenth Century, Secretary of State Richard Olney could declaim during the Venezuelan dispute with Great Britain that the United States' ''word was fiat on this continent''. Whatever we may wish, it is *not* fiat around the world. To pretend otherwise will make us look foolish. The focus of our foreign policy concern, as Paul Nitze has said, should be ''what kind of relations among the leading powers''. We must be cautious about involving ourselves in matters of lesser consequences. We should be restrained in word as well as deed. The United States is not obliged to comment on everything. Meddling in issues in which our interests are only tangentially involved, nagging others about their defects, real or imaginary, may make us feel good for the moment. It is not the road to successful or long-term leadership.

To provide long-term leadership, other nations must understand that we do not speak casually or loosely. When we do choose to make a commitment, other nations need to know that we can and probably will live up to it. Always remember: leadership is not an inheritance; it must be earned anew, each decade, each year.●

TRIBUTE TO MARTHA COMER

● Mr. MCCONNELL. Mr. President, I rise today to pay tribute to an outstanding Kentuckian who has been selected for induction into the Kentucky Journalism Hall of Fame. Mrs. Martha Comer of Maysville, KY, is devoted to her profession, to the Ledger-Independent, formerly the Daily Independent, and to her community.

Martha Comer was born in 1906, the same year that her father founded the Daily Independent. It is not surprising that Martha displayed her journalistic qualities at a young age. She served as the editor of the school annual at Maysville High School. Upon her graduation from high school she began working on the editorial staff of the Daily Independent. She assumed the duties as editor in 1935, although her name did not appear as editor until 1941.

In 1968 the Daily Independent was sold to the Maysville Publishing Corp. and became the Ledger-Independent. At this time Martha became the editor and was responsible for publishing both the morning and afternoon editions. Although Mrs. Comer retired on January 7, 1977, she continued to remain on as an editorial consultant. For many years she continued to write a daily column and editorials. And to this day, Martha Comer still writes editorial commentary two or three times a week for the Labor-Independent.

Mrs. Comer's editorial involvement allowed her to become actively involved with her community. She has campaigned tirelessly for many organizations and causes, such as advocating public policy and teaching in the literacy program.

Mr. President, I would like my colleagues to join me in paying tribute to Martha Comer, a new inductee into the Kentucky Journalism Hall of Fame. I am positive that Mrs. Comer will continue to display the great qualities in which she has in the past. I know that her community appreciates her involvement and dedication.●

TRIBUTE TO DENNIS GRIFFIN

● Mr. MCCONNELL. Mr. President, I rise today to pay tribute to Dennis Griffin, a resident of Bowling Green, KY, who is being recognized as one of the top local developers in the Nation. Mr. Griffin is 1 of 10 economic developers who received a leadership award from the American Economic Development Council.

Mr. Griffin has been president of the Bowling Green-Warren County Chamber of Commerce since 1986, the same year he moved to Kentucky. Since taking over as president of the chamber of commerce the local economy has soared. Mr. Griffin is best described by Bowling Green Mayor Johnny Webb in a recent article in the Daily News. Mayor Webb said,

> Things were not going too well in Bowling Green. It had been some time since we had recruited a new industry. It was almost like a lightbulb coming on when (Griffin) came in and got his feet on the ground. He is the catalyst to development.

Mr. President, during the last 9 years, Mr. Griffin has worked hard to develop the region. He is responsible for starting 56 new companies, and establishing 6,000 new jobs; an investment of more than $400 million in the community. But that's not all, Mr. Griffin also worked hard to help 72 existing industries expand, which created an additional 2,500 jobs, investing another $100 million in the community.

Mr. Griffin, just like the Energizer Bunny, is still going strong even after 9 years of service. In the last year alone, 10 new plants have decided to call Bowling Green their home and 9 companies have expanded.

Mr. President, I ask my colleagues to join me in paying tribute to this outstanding Kentuckian. I think that all will agree that through his hard work and dedication for his community, Mr. Griffin proves that he truly deserves the honor of being one of the country's top local developers.●

MORNING BUSINESS

ALASKA NATIVE CLAIMS SETTLEMENT AMENDMENT ACT

Mr. GORTON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the immediate consideration of Calendar No. 43, H.R. 421, the Cook Inlet Region bill, that the bill be deemed read a third time, passed, that the motion to reconsider be laid upon the table, and that any statements relating to the bill be placed at the appropriate place in the RECORD.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, the Senate is about to take up H.R. 421, the Alaska Native Claims Act Amendment Act of 1995. I wish to take a few moments to describe H.R. 421 and importance of passing the bill this evening.

On March 15, 1995, the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources unanimously reported nearly identical legislation for consideration by the full Senate.

The bill allows the Cook Inlet Region Incorporated Native corporation, called CIRI, to consider creating a system to buy back the stock of willing sellers, provided that stockholders vote to set up such a system. It will serve as a test for an alternate system of stock distribution that could later be expanded for use by any of the State's Native regional corporations.

The goal of H.R. 421 is simple: to provide a responsible middle ground so that shareholders will have access to the capital value of their stock, while preserving the Native control and ownership of the ANCSA corporations.

Originally under the 1971 Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, Native shareholders were prevented from selling their stock for 20 years. This was to give the corporations time to mature. As part of a series of 1991 amendments to the corporations, Congress changed the law, at the request of the Natives, so that stock restrictions on alienability—the right of Natives to sell their shares—automatically continued unless and until the shareholders of a corporation voted to remove them.

H.R. 421 will provide another alternative. Shareholders will be able to sell their stock back to the corporation, helping preserve Native control if: First the corporation's board votes to participate; second, the majority of the entire membership of the corporation votes to permit buybacks; and third, if